The Idiot Behind the Iron Mask

I include herewith choice quotations procured from legal judgments.

(The judgments come from five different states, the applicable law of each being either common law or its derivation thereof. Look at the quotations in detail, and try to take notice of the how the usage of English differs from region to region. And if you’re wondering, I intentionally chose to exclude the names of cases and the names of the judges who had decided them. But if you are still curious, a simple Google search will reveal to you their details.)

I do this quotation thingy out of sheer curiosity; also, I’d like to allow the curious reader an insight into the difficulty inherent in deciphering (no, not understanding, or comprehending, or interpreting, but deciphering) legal judgments.

(Because some people I know actually think that law is as easy as knowing how to waffle your way about words.)

Enjoy.

——

India:

That is also the reason why both these Articles begin with a non obstante clause and thus in our opinion exclude the concept of domicile for the purposes of these Articles. If that was so and if the concept of domicile is excluded from these two Articles and we have no doubt that it is so excluded by the use of the non obstante clause in both these Articles, the word migrated used therein must be given the wider meaning. If we give the narrower meaning to it we shall be introducing the concept of domicile in these two Articles which was obviously not intended by the Constitution-makers and in any case was definitely negatived by the use of the non obstante clause at the beginning of both these Articles.

England:

The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be - persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.

America:

It was not until after the War Between the States that legislation began generally to replace the common law. Most of these initial statutes dealt severely with abortion after quickening but were lenient with it before quickening. Most punished attempts equally with completed abortions. While many statutes included the exception for an abortion thought by one or more physicians to be necessary to save the mother’s life, that provision soon disappeared and the typical law required that the procedure actually be necessary for that purpose.

Australia:

Here the question is different. It seems to me a mistake to approach the case by asking whether the plaintiff is precluded by considerations of public policy from asserting a right of action for negligence. The proper inquiry seems to me to be simply: is there for him a right of action? That depends upon whether in the circumstances the law imposed a duty of care; for a right of action and a duty of care are inseparable. The one predicates the other. Duty here does not mean an abstract and general rule of conduct. It is not the duty to God and neighbour of the catechist’s question.

Malaysia:

I cannot but conclude in the circumstances that there is in fact by the exercise of the power conferred by s 418A on the Public Prosecutor an incursion into the judicial power of the Federation and that any other view would ex necessitate rei result in relegating the provisions of article 121(1) vesting the judicial power of the Federation in the curial entities specified to no more than a teasing illusion, like a munificent bequest in a pauper’s will. The power of the Public Prosecutor under s 418A is uncanalized, unconfined and vagrant.